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Pk.t  LA- ~ALZUt -1-o ~ 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S ~ ~  
COMPENSATION PROGRA...""1S, U.S. L ~.--- A. ~ ~ /_ /.: 1. _ _ J...v- LP_ ~/ . 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v ~ ~ J ·-~ · 
----------- J.kc L;uffiz a'*!J=~ Gc 0 ~ 1 ~ ( ~
v. ~~ ~..Ltl ~J 
GENEVIVE RASMUSSEN (widow) Federal/Civil Ti@ely 
~lo~~~ 
No. 77-1491 ~~~~~~ 
GEO CONTROL, INC. & f;::~-~ ~~{L~ 
INSURANCE CO. (emplo~a;d~ ~  ~· /A,a:?l 
his insurer) ·~~.
c::: ~4 ~ ~ I - ,., .1 . 
v. s-~ ~~ 
RASMUSSEN (beneficiary) ~  fAA-< · ~. 
1. Summary. This petition presen~uestion of 
whether the Longshor emeri' s and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, imposes t he same maximum on payment s in 
~ 
the case of death - payments to survivor s that it impo ses in the 
'-._...//"' 
case of comp ensation - payments to victims. 
~ ~/ea.~~~."-.A/~~'5' 
~- 2J;J(VJ'J' 5t~ ~~~t:4~ Q__ 
~~ 1 ~  
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2. Facts. GEO Control was a public contractor operating -------., 
under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651, which incorporates 
... 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Horker's Compensation Act, a 
comprehensive scheme for benefiting an employee injured on 
the job or his survivors if he is killed on the job, by 
payments proportionate to his earnings. William Rasmussen 
was an employee of GEO Control working in Viet-Nam. He was 
killed by a land mine, and his widow and son are entitled to 
some benefits. 
Act: 
The case revolves around the following provisions of the 
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 906 (b)(l): 
Com~ensation forJaisability' shall not exceed 
the folfowing percentages oil:l:i'"e ·app ~cable 
national average weekly wage as determined by 
the Secretary under paragraph (3): 
(A) 125 per centum or $167, whichever is greater, 
during the period ending September 30, 1973. 
(B) 150 per centum during the period beginning 
October 1, 1973, and ending September 30, 1975. 
(C) 175 per centt~ during the period beginning 
October 1, 1974, and ending September 30, 1975. 
(D) 200 per centum beggining October 1, 1975. 
(b) (3): 
(d): 
As soon as practicable after June 30 of each year, 
and in any event prior to October 1 of such year, 
the Secretary shall determine the national average 
weekly wage for the three consecutive calendar quarters 
ending June 30. 
Determinations under . this subsection with respect to 
a period shall apply to employees or survivors currently 
receiving compensation for permanent total disability 
t • ' 
'I:· 
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or death benefits during such period, as well 
as those newly awarded compensation during such 
period. 
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 909(b): 
(e) : 
If the inJ· ury causes death . . • the compensation 
?~ ~ ~~~~~---
~h~ll be kno~ as a ueath benef it and shall be payable 
1n the amount and to or for the benefit of the 
persons following: ... 
(b) If there be a widow or widower and no 
child of the deceased, to such widow or widower 
50 per centum of the average wages of the deceased, 
during widowhood, or dependent widowerhood, with 
two years' compensation in one sum upon remarriage; 
and if there be a surviving child or children of the 
deceased, the additional amount of 16 2/3 per centum 
of such wages for each child; in the case of the 
death or remarriage of such widow or widower, [etc.] 
• . • Provided, That the total amount payable shall 
in no case exceed 66 2/3 per centum of such wages. 
In computing death benefits the average v7eekly 
wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been 
not less than the applicable national average weekly 
wage as prescribed in section 6(b) but the total 
weekly benefits shall not exceed the average weekly 
wages of the deceased. 
33 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 910(f): 
Effective October 1 of each year, the compensation 
or death benefits payable for permanent total disability 
or death arising out of injuries sustained after the 
date of enactment of this subsection shall be increased 
by a percentage equal to the percentage (if any)_ by 
which the applicable national weekly wage for the 
period beginning on such Octobe r 1, as determined under 
section 906(b) of this title, exceeds the applicable 
national average \veekly --wage, as so de termine d, for 
the period beginning with the preceding October 1. 
GEO Control paid Mrs. Rasmussen and her son according to 
. . . 
the maximum levels set in 33 u.s.c. § 906 (b)(l) for ·d:l;ability 
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but the Rasmussens contended that they should be paid according 
to 33 U.S.C. § 909(b) for death benefits. The administrative 
law judge at the Benefits Review Board, Department of Labor, 
agreed with the Rasmussens, and the Board affirmed his decision. 
Appeal was taken to CA 9 by the Director of the Office of 
Workmen's Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, and 
by GEO Control. 
3. Opinion below (no dissents). CA 9 affirmed the Benefits 
Review Board. The dispute centers around confusing cross-
references in the above uoted sections. 906(b)(l) describes 
maximum levels of compensation for disability. But 906(d) 
refers to"determinations under this subsection . . . for 
permanent total disability or death benefits . ." (emphasis 
added). Hence, the maximum in 906(b)(l) seems to apply to 
death benefits as well. However, 909(b) explicitly provides 
the scale for death benefits, and it is higher than the scale 
for disability if, as in this case, the decedent's earnings 
were significarutly above the national average. 906(b)(l) sets 
maxima in terms of the national average; 909(b) sets maxima in 
terms of the actual wages that had been received, and 909(e) 
Q.Lo Jt fr .. .' 
puts a floor on that e~ the national average, 
;, 
The problem is which lead to follow. CA 9 observed that 
before the 1972 amendments, the maximum payments had been the same 
whether the cause were death or disability. The court then traced 
the legislative history, noting particularly the frequent recognitior 
-5-
of the fact that maximum levels of death compensation were 
to be removed. A good example is set out in footnote 7, p. lOA, 
where the section-by-section description of the amendment 
comments thaothe dollar minimum and maximum levels under 
the old law were being removed, and a new minimum imposed. 
The difficulty with this view is that 906(d) then has 
very little meaning when it refers to death benefits. CA 9 
held that it would still make sense to interpret the word 
"determinations" to refer to the minimum levels, which, according 
to 906(b)(3), would be set in terms of the national average 
wage. 
4. Contentions. The Solicitor General, representing 
the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
Department of Labor, begins his brief by assuring the Court 
that the Director's standing to challenge the Board's opinion 
could be fully defended, if the Court grants cert. or requests 
a supplemental memorandum. 
On the merits, the SG points out a direct conflict between 
CA 9 and CADC and CA3. This i~ a genuine conflict. In 
Director v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (1976) (CA 3) and 
Director v. Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (19760 (CADC), the respective 
courts overruled the 3oard's position, explicitly ~eferring to 
this case. And the CA 9 opinion in this case explicitly refers 
to the CADC case, though it does not explicitly observe a conflict . 
. ' 
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The SG's argument relies on 906(d), which does · refer 
to the calculation of death benefits as made in that subsection. 
If 906(d) were interpreted merely to be a reference to the 
national average wage, to be used in calculating the minimum 
amount of benefits, then there would have been no need for 
910(f), which speaks in very direct terms about adjusting and 
calculating the national average. The SG further contends that 
it would have been irrational for the Congress to favor the 
relatives of deceased workers rather than the worker himself 
while he is disabled. Although the two groups are not in direct 
conflict, it is true that CA9's interpretation will lead to 
an increase in benefits upon the death of a disabled worker. 
The SG urges that cert. be granted to resolve the conflict 
l between CA 9 and CA 3, CADC. There are ~40 cases still pending where compensation is in doubt, this is because the provisio r 
of 906(b)(l) stipulate increased levels of -compensation in the 
later years, so that the disparity has mooted out. The petitioner 
1 
GAO mirrors the SG's arguments, but provides the useful statistic 
that there are 770,000 employees potentially covered by this Act. 
The respondent does not discuss the conflict a~ong the 
circuits. But it urges that the issue is of no general importance, 
drawing on the statistics provided by petitioner that only 40 
out of 770,000 cases are involved, and there is no likelihood of 
any future cases arising in view of the increasing steps in 
906(b)(l). 
-7-
5. Discussion. There is an undeniable conflict over this 
question of statutory inter retation. Under CA9's view, 
906(d) must be given a meaning that is strained, and that 
is superfluous in light of 910 (f). Under CA3 and CADC's 
view, 909(b) is subordinated to the maximum levels set in 
906(b)(l), which, in its terms, applies only to disability 
benefits. 
Since these benefits run for as long as the survivors 
are alive and eligible (for children, under a certain age; 
for spouses, diminished levels after re-marriage), it is 
certain that some beneficiaries will receive more than their 
equally -situated fellow beneficiaries when the only difference 
is the federal judicial circuit in which they are located. 
The act could generate raore cas~s in the admittedly unlikely 
event of a national wage deflation, so that the higher percentages 
in 906(b)(l), when multiplied by the national average, still 
produce a lower amount thaLl 909 (b), which is geared to the wage 
actually paid to the worker during his lifetime. If the present 
economy's wages are ever to be viewed as excessively high (as 
the 1920 wage levels might have been viewed in the 1930's), then 
the anomaly could arise again. 
On the merits, I confess to an almost equally balanced ---mind. CA 9 strikes me as slightly more persuasive since the -section directly dealing with death benefits ought to control 
over a section in its terms dealing with compensation for disability 
-8-
and only made applicable to the case of death benefits by 
the operation of another provision, several subseqtions away. 
Both views necessitate concluding that some part of· the Act 
is superfluous. 
My recommendation is to grant in No.77-1491, where 
petitioner's standing is beyond question, and to request 
the Solicitor to submit the memo he suggested concerning 
the standing of the Director of the Office of Workers' 
Comp~nsation Programs to petition the Court in this case. 
5/30/78 Campbell Opinion in petition 
There is a response. 
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~.!!r/0Acf. 
The issue in this case is whether the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, as amended (the Act), 
imposes the same maximum limitation on death benefits as it 
imposes on disability benefits. In the present case, the CA 9 
------~~---~-----------held that the Act does not impose the same limitation. In 
Director v~ O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (3d Cir. 1976), and Director 
v~ Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (D.C.Cir. 1976), the courts reached 
the opposite conclusion. (~~) 
2. 
Several of the Briefs reproduce the relevant statutory 
provisions. The most helpful is that of petr Geo Control, at 
5~ 
~ 
d~EO'S" pp. 3-7, which juxtaposes the provisions of the Act before an 
after the 1972 amendments. 
1. The Language of the Statute 
) I 
Section 9(e) of the Act establishes limits on death 
,, 
benefits under the Act. Before 1972, §9(e) established both a 
maximum and minimum limit. The maximum limit on weekly 
benefits was $70 (2/3 x $105; see§ 9(d)), the minimum limit 
$18 (2/3 x $27) or actual weekly wage, whichever was lower. 
The amended §9(e) clearly provides for a minimum limit equal to 
two-thirds of the "applicable national average weekly wage," or 
to actual average weekly wage of the decedent, whichever is 
less. The amended version of § 9(e) does not contain any ~~ 
In contrast, §§6(b)(1) & (2) ~ maximum limit on death benefits. 
-----------------------------contain provisions setting both maximum and minimum limits onA' _ ~~.~ 
,, -
lldisability compensation in terms of the national average weekly 
wage. The petrs entire effort in this case is directed to~ ~-~ 
repairing the silence of amended §9(e) on this point. 5 
The efforts of petrs based on language in other ~  
~~ '7(_<) 
sections of the Act are ingenious but unconvincing. They argue ~
that §6(d) links death benefits and disability benefits, and ~ 
~. 
shows that the limitations of §6(b) on maximum disability 
~-
. ' 
benefits should be read into §9(e) to limit death benefits. To 
reach this result, the petrs argue that the "determinations" 
referred to in §6(d) are the calculations of maximum limits 
under § 6 (b) ( 1 ) • 
Section 6(b)(1 ), however, by its terms applies only to ------------.. 
"compensation for disability" and does not mention death 
benefits. Further, the term "determinations" in §6(d) is read 
-----. 
most reasonably as referring to the requirement of §6(b)(3) 
that "the Secretary shall determine" periodically the national 
average weekly wage. On this reading, and by mentioning both 
disability and death benefits, section 6(d) applies the latest 
determination of national average weekly wage to the 
calculation of §6(b) and §9(e) limitations applicable to those 
whose eligibility commenced in some preceding period. The 
effect is to keep the limits for all current beneficiaries 
moving with the national average weekly wage, rather than 
leaving beneficiaries stuck forever with the limits in effect 
in the year in which they first became eligible. On this 
reading, nothing in §6(d) alters the fact that §9(e) makes the 
national average weekly wage relevant only to calculate the 
minimum weekly death benefit. 
Petrs argue that if one adopts the view of §6(d) just 
stated, then the reference to "survivors" in that section is 
superfluous in view of §10(f). Section 10(f) provides: 
"(f) Effective October 1 of each year, 
the compensation or death benefits 
3. 
payable for permanent total disability 
or death arising out of injuries 
sustained after October 27, 1972, shall 
be increased by a percentage equal to 
the percentage (if any) by which the 
applicable national weekly wage for the 
period beginning on such October 1, as 
determined under section 6(b), exceeds 
the applicable national average weekly 
wage, as so determined, for the period 
beginning with the preceding October 
1 • " 
The petrs argue that since §10(f) already provides for the 
annual upward adjustment of benefits in line with the latest 
calculation of the national average weekly wage, §6(d) must 
have some other purpose than simply adjusting the §9(e) limit 
on minimum benefits. They urge that §6(d), in view of §10(f), 
makes sense only if there are also maximum limits on death 
benefits. The reasoning supporting this point can be 
illustrated by the following examples. 
Section 6(d) applies the latest determination of 
national average weekly wage to the calculation of the relevant 
limitations under §9(e) and §6(b). But consider a beneficiary 
(either a permanently disabled worker or the survivor of a 
deceased worker) who, when first eligible, qualifies for 
benefits somewhat above the minimum allowed by either §9(e) or 
§6(b). Under §6(d), considered alone, his benefits would 
remain constant as the national average weekly wage increased, 
until the minimum limitation finally caught up with his 
original level of benefits and began to push it upwards. 
Section 10(f) avoids this result by increasing all death 
4. 
benefits or compensation for permanent total disability each 
year by a percentage equal to the increase that year in the 
national average weekly wage. The recipient remains each year 
in the same position relative to the §6(b) and §9(e) limits. 
Now consider the same recipient of benefits under 
§10(f) alone. His benefits would increase each year as the 
national average weekly wage increased, until the amount of 
benefits bumped up against the maximum limit applicable at the 
time that he was awarded benefits. Section 6(d) avoids that 
result by applying each year's determination of the average 
wage to the limits applicable to~ recipients, not just to 
those who are awarded compensation beginning in that period. 
But if §9(e) imposes no maximum limit on death benefits, then 
§10(f) alone would take care indefinitely of annual upward 
adjustments in survivors' benefits. There would be no uppoer 
limit for death benefits to "bump up against," and therefore no 
reason to refer to "survivors" in §6(d). 
The petrs have identified an anomaly in the statute, 
but only one involving a superfluity and not an inconsistency. 
'--------~-------------------------------------------------~d The anomaly may be eliminated by construing §6(d) to impose the 
maximum benefit limits of §6(b) (1) on §9(e). As I see it, the 
question is whether to respond to the anomaly by tolerating it, 
or by ignoring the plain language of§§ 6(b)(1) and 9(e), which 
applies a mizimum limit only to disability compensation. I 
would stay with the plain language, especially in view of the 
5. 
legislative history. 
2. The ·Legislative ·History 
I will review only the principle arguments of the 
parties, and indicate why I think resps have the better of the 
case on this ground as well as on the statutory language. 
In 1972, two bills were introduced to amend the Act. 
Under one bill, co-sponsored by Senator Eagleton, the Chairman 
of the committee handling the matter, maximum limits on death 
and disability compensation were eliminated. Under the other 
bill, the fixed dollar limits were increased substantially. 
The SG notes that both bills treated death and disability 
benefits the same way, and reasons that the resulting 
compromise (limits, but linked to a national wage average that 
takes inflation into account) must have retained that feature. 
Accordingly, he concludes, if maximum disability benefits are 
set by §6(b), then the same maximum limits must be applicable 
to death benefits under §9(e). This is a non sequitur; it 
depends upon the unsupported and unsupportable assumption that 
any compromise necessarily retains the symmetry that the SG 
perceives in the original bills. 
The SG points out that in the Report of the National 
cpmmission · on · state · workm~n'§ · cgmpensat!on ; Laws · (commissign 
Report), the Commission accepted the need for maximum limits on 
death benefits. He also notes that the Commission Report 
appears to have been influential in shaping several provisions 
6. 
of the amendments to the Act, and that the Senate Report on the 
bill as reported said that "the provisions of tis bill are 
fully consistent with the recommendations of the [Commission)." 
This comment in the Senate Report, however, is contained in the 
final paragraph of the summary of the report. If one turns, to 
the portions of the report dealing with §9(e), one gets a more 
just estimation of the committee's actual view of that section. 
In the general discussion of the major provisions of 
the Act, with reference to "Survivor Benefits" payable under §§ 
8 and 9 of the Act, the Senate Report noted that such benefits 
are "subject to a maximum of 66 2/3 percent of the average 
weekly wages" of the decedent. In the same passage, the Report 
commented that "[a) minimum death benefit tied to the 
applicable national average weekly wage but not to exceed the 
employee's average weekly wage is also provided." There is no 
mention of a maximum limit on death benefits in§ 9(e), other 
than the provision for a maximum minimum--that is, the benefits 
cannot exceed actual wages, even if that figure is less than 
two-thirds of the national average. 
Later in the Report, in the section-by-section 
analysis, the Report contains the following comment on §9(e): 
"Section 10(d) amends section 9(e) to provide that in computing 
death benefits the employee's average weekly wage shall be 
considered as not less than the national average weekly wage. 
However, maximum weekly death benefits could not be more than 
7. 
the employee's average weekly wages." Again, there is no 
indication that the limitations on disability benefits 
established in §6(b) are to be read into §9(e). 
In a subsequent portion of the Report, the change in }fl 
§9(e) was indicated by bracketing language to be deleted and v\ 
italicizing language to be added: 
"(e) In computing death benefits the 
average weekly wages of the deceased 
shall be considered to have been not 
[more than $105 nor] less than [$27] 
the applicable national · average ·weekl 
wage ·as prescr1 e 1n ·sect1on · ut 
the total weekly [compensation] 
benefits shall not exceed the average 
weekly wages of the deceased." 
The clear indication is that the maximum limitation was 
eliminated from §9(e) by the amendments of 1972. 
The House Report on the bill amending the Act was even 
more explicit about the change made in §9(e). "[The bill] 
amends section 9(e) of the Act, eliminating the dollar minimum 
and maximum set out under present law for the average weekly 
wages of the deceased to be used in computing death benefits. 
The minimum substituted by this amendment is the applicable 
national average weekly wage as prescribed in section 6(b) of 
the Act, except that the total weekly benefits may not exceed 
the actual average weekly wages of the deceased." 
follows: 
The House Report marked the changes in §9(e) as 
"(e) In computing death benefits the 
average weekly wages of the deceased 
8. 
shall be considered to have been not 
[more than $105 nor less than $27 but 
the total weekly compensation shall not 
exceed the weekly wages of the 
deceased] less · than · the · applicable 
national average weekly wage ·as 
prescribed · in · section · G(b) · but · the 
total weekly 9enefits shall no€ exceed 
the · average ·weekly ·wages ·of the 
decease~~" ' 
Against all of these indications that the maximum 
limit on death benefits was eliminated from §9(e) by the 1972 
amendments, the petrs find support in a sinqle sentence of the 
summary discussion of "Maximum and minimum benefit amounts." 
The sentence seems to indicate that increases in death 
benefits, like disability compensation, are subject to the 
phase-in schedule of §6(b). "To the extent that employees 
receiving compensation for total permanent disability or 
survivors receiving death benefits receive less than the 
compensation they would receive if there were no phase-in, 
their compensation is to be increased as the ceiling moves to 
200 percent." I note that in the subsequent analysis of §6(b), 
the ~port limits its effect to "compensation for disability." 
The remainder of the petrs' legislative history 
--------------------------------------------arguments fall into several categories: (1) Congress would not 
~-------------------------~ 
have removed maximum limits on death benefits without more 
extensive discussion in the committee Reports; (2) Congress 
would not have removed the maximum limit on death benefits 
without doing the same for disability compensation; (3) 
Congress would not have removed the maximum limit on death 
9. 
benefits because it is a bad idea to do so; and (4) Congress 
would not have eliminated the maximum limit on death benefits 
because the proposal to set a maximum limit related to national 
average wage, when made by a witness at the committee's 
hearings on the bill, was suggested for both death and 
disability benefits; since Congress adopted the suggestion for 
disability benefits, it must have done so for death benefits. 
None of these arguments is convincing in the face of the 
language of the statute and the committee Reports on the 
amendments. 
3. Decisions of the ·cA · 3 and CA DC 
In ~irector · v. Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (D.C.Cir. 1976), 
the CA agreed with the position taken by petrs in the present 
case. To the arguments already reviewed, the CA added only 
one: 
"Foremost among our reasons for 
reaching this conclusion is the 
commonsense conviction that Congress 
did not intend to provide, without ever 
so stating and in sharp 
contradistinction to every previous 
version of the Act, that a totally 
disabled employee, in need of 
continuing care, should be compensated 
less generously than the family of an 
employee who dies. It is hardly within 
the policy of this Act to place a 
premium on death." 
~- at 213. The Act greatly liberalized the compensation 
paid to disabled workers under §6(b). That §9(e) appears to 
have gone even further in liberalizing the benefits paid to 
1 0 • 
survivors of deceased workers does not seem to me to be a good 
reason for concluding that §9(e) "really" was meant to go only 
as far as §6(b). 
In Director v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337 (3d Cir. 1976), the 
CA also agreed with the position taken by the petrs here. The 
CA 3 relied principally upon the anomaly introduced by the 
reference to "survivors" in §6(d). 
summa~y 
The petrs have two arquable bases for their position: 
(1) the anomalous reference to "survivors" in §6(d); and (2) 
the sentence from the Senate Report, quoted at p. 9 supra. The 
anomaly is real, at least as I have read the statutory system. 
The sentence from the legislative report does appear to 
contemplate the application of §6(b) (1) limitations to 
survivors' benefits under§ 9(e). 
The language of the statute, however, seems to me to 
be clear enough. Section 6(b) (1) is limited explicitly to 
disability compensation. Section 9(e), applicable to death 
benefits, contains only a minimum limit. The Senate and House 
Reports indicate that the maximum limit on death benefits was 
eliminated by the 1972 amendments. I recommend affirming the 
CA 9 in this case. 
1 1 • 
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~lanuary lR, 1979 
No. 14-1465 Director v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 
Please show at the end of the next draft of your 
opinion that I took no part in the decision of this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
I did not participate in decision because I 
attended a funeral in New York on Nov. 28 when 
this case was argued. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS O F 
-
.;§uprtm.t QJl!Url d t!rt 'Jllnittb ;§taUs 
~MJrhtghm. IIJ. QJ. 20~'1-$ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART January 18, 19 79 
Re: No. 77-1465 & 77-1491 - Director, Workers' 
Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
i'ltJlr.tUU QiltUrl o-f f4.t ~b' ,.Shd.t# 
~agJrin:ghtn. ~. <4- 2llp'!' 
I 
January 18, 1979 
Re: 77-1465; 1491 - Director v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u.prttttt <!fcnrl ttf ffrt ~~ ~taf.tg 
~Mfrin:gtcn. ~.<!f. zo~~~ 
January 19, 1979 
REc Nos. 77-1465 & 77-1491 Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs and GEO Control 
v. Rasmussen, et al. 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist -
cc: The Conference - -
v 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~upuntt <!fllltrl of tqt ~tb ~~tg 
,rMlfingtott. ~. elf. 211~'!~ 
January 19, 1979 
Re: Nos. 77-1465 & 77-1491: Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, US Department of Labor 
v. Rasmussen; and Geo Control, Inc., 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JU S TICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~u:prtntt cqcurl of tJrt 'J!ittittb- ~taf.tg 
2li ag I:p:ttg1cn:. tB . <q. 2.0 gtJ!.,;l ' 




Re: No. 77-14 6 5 - Director v. R a smu sse n 
No. 77-1491 - Geo. Control, Inc. v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 
Please join m e. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Ju s tic e R e h n q u ist 
c c: The C onferenc e 
.:§u:vrrntt <!fcurl cf tfrt ~b .:§ta.t.u 
'maslyington, gl. <!f. 2!JgiJl.;t 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 1, 1979 
Re: 77-1465 - Director v. Rasmussen and 
77-1491 - Geo Control v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE February 1, 1979 
Re: (77-1465 - Director v. Rasmussen 
( 
(77-1491 - Geo Control v. Rasmussen 
Dear Bill: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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